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NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, THE
TENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE
CONDITIONAL SPENDING POWER
MICHAEL SPENCER KOLKER*
I. INTRODUCTION: NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v. USERY
In National League of Cities v. Usery,I the United States Supreme
Court held that the tenth amendment2 was an affirmative constraint3
* B.A., Brandeis University, 1977; J.D. Washington University, 1981.
1. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
2. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people"
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
3. National League of Cities is especially significant in that it reestablished the
tenth amendment as an affirmative force in constitutional law. Since 1937, the
Supreme Court traditionally had interpreted the tenth amendment as having no af-
firmative influence limiting the power of the federal government. In United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1940), the Supreme Court characterized this amendment as "but
a truism that all is retained that has not been surrendered." Id. at 124.
The Court's holding in National League of Cities is not, however, a complete sur-
prise. There is language in prior cases indicating that the Court never intended to
totally ignore the tenth amendment or the concept of federalism as a vital force in
constitutional law. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) (tenth
amendment is not insignificant because it declares that Congress may not impair the
ability of states to function effectively in the federal system); United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (Congress is traditionally reluctant to legislate in ways that
would upset the delicate federal-state relationship); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44
(1970) (federalism represents a system protective of the legitimate interests of both the
state and national governments); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968), va-
cated, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Court has ample authority to prevent destruction of the
states as sovereign political entities).
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on the congressional commerce power.4 At issue was the constitu-
tionality of the 1974 amendments5 to the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).6 The amendments extended coverage of the Act's minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions to all state and local govern-
ment employees.7 A group of state and municipal organizations and
state and local governments argued that the amendments were un-
constitutional, not because they exceeded the proper scope of the
commerce power, but because they infringed on state sovereignty in
violation of the tenth amendment. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a
plurality of four,' agreed, holding that the 1974 FLSA amendments
were unconstitutional insofar as they directly displaced the states' au-
thority to conduct integral operations in areas of traditional state sov-
ereignty. 9
The tenth amendment constraints established in NationalLeague of
Cities apply only to the commerce power. The Supreme Court spe-
cifically left open the question of whether the tenth amendment simi-
larly constrains other enumerated powers.10
4. "The Congress shall have power ... to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
ci. 3.
5. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 2, 88 Stat. 55
(amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970)).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970) (amended 1974).
7. The 1974 amendments expanded the definition of "employer" to include a
"public agency." Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259,
§ 6, 88 Stat. 60 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970)). In addition, the definition of
"enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" was
expanded to include "an activity of a public agency." Id. § 6 (amending 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(s) (1970)).
8. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell and Stewart joined Justice Rehnquist.
Justice Blackmun concurred in a brief opinion, stating that he read the plurality as
creating a test that would allow a compelling federal interest to override state sover-
eignty limitations on Congress' power. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices White and Marshall, saw the polit-
ical process as a sufficient restraint on the commerce power. He condenmed the plu-
rality for repudiating the long standing precedent that the tenth amendment was not
an affirmative constraint on the commerce power. Id. at 856-80 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Stevens dissented separately, reasoning that it was inconsistent to pro-
hibit Congress from regulating the wages of state employees when it could
constitutionally regulate so many other activities of the states. Id. at 880-81 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 852 (1976).
10. The Court stated: "We express no view as to whether different results might
obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercis-
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When the Court decided National League of Cities, many legal
commentators believed the case signalled the beginning of a major
revision of traditional federalism theory. 1 They perceived a new
willingness by the Court to accept a more active role as "arbiter" of
the federal system.' 2 Despite these predictions, federal courts gener-
ally have interpreted National League of Cities very narrowly, 3 re-
fusing to extend tenth amendment protection beyond the limits it
established. '
ing authority granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as the spending
power, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 852 n.17.
11 See, e.g., Matsumoto, National League of Cities-From Footnote to Holding-
State Immunity from Commerce Clause Regulation, 1977 ARiz. ST. L.J. 35, 76-89
(1977); Note, Emerging Concepts of Federalirm: Limitations on the Spending Power
and National Health Planning, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1133, 1147 (1977). But see
Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery; New Meaningfor the Tenth Amendment?,
1976 SuP. CT. RV. 161.
12. Id.
13. Courts usually cite National League of Cities with approval only in cases in-
volving a congressional exercise of the commerce or tax powers that invades an area
of traditional state sovereignty. See, e.g., Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d
1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 1979) (employees of municipally owned airport not covered by
minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of FLSA since operation of municipal
airport is an integral function of city government); United States v. Best, 573 F.2d
1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 1978) (federal government may not regulate the licensing of driv-
ers pursuant to commerce clause; licensing of drivers is an area of traditional state
sovereignty); Wentworth v. Solem, 548 F.2d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 1977) (minimum wage
provisions of FLSA may not be applied to state convicts as regulation of state penal
institutions is an integral state function which may not be intruded upon by Congress
pursuant to commerce power); Georgia Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 430 F.
Supp. 823, 825 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (absent compelling federal interest, Congress may not
tax state use of aircraft when such use is in furtherance of integral state function);
Association of Court Reporters v. Superior Court, 424 F. Supp. 90, 93-94 (D.D.C.
1976) (overtime provisions of FLSA not applicable to court reporters who are local
government employees).
Justice Rehnquist used the implicit federalism constraints on the tax power estab-
lished in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), to support his conclusion in
National League of Cities that the Tenth Amendment may be extended to similarly
constrain Congress' use of the commerce power. 426 U.S. at 843. Justice Brennan, in
dissent, tried to distinguish the tax power from the commerce power. He argued the
constraints on the former should not be extended to the latter. Id. at 869 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
14. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,453 n.9 (1976) (extension of Title
VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 to states is valid since Title VII passed pursuant to § 5
of Fourteenth Amendment, which is not constrained by Tenth Amendment); Peel v.
Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070, 1082-85 (5th Cir. 1979) (National League of
Cities does not block application of Veterans Re-employment Rights Act to state and
local governments as act was passed pursuant to war power); Arrit v. Grisell, 567 F.2d
19811
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Nevertheless, NationalLeague of Cities does raise major questions
concerning the nature of the federal system generally, and the
Supreme Court's proper role in deciding federalism issues. Argua-
bly, if the tenth amendment is to be effective at all, it must protect
states from any congressional attempts to intrude on areas of tradi-
tional state sovereignty, regardless of the enumerated power used. 5
II. THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONDITIONAL
SPENDING POWER
This note will examine instances of congressional use of the condi-
tional spending power16 which interfere with the ability of state and
1267, 1270 (4th Cir. 1977) (National League of Cities does not block application of
Age Discrimination in Employment Act to state and local governments; act was
passed pursuant to fifth clause of Fourteenth Amendment). See generally Note, Title
VII and Public Employers: Did Congress Exceed Its Powers? 78 COLUM. L. REv. 372
(1978); Note, National League of Cities v. Usery: Its Implicationsfor the Equal Pay
Act and The Age Discrimination in EmploymentAct, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 239 (1977).
The traditionally narrow scope of the tenth amendment can be in part attributed to
the long standing belief that Congress, not the Court, is the institution best suited to
be the "arbiter" of federalism issues. Congress consists of representatives of the states
who are politically dependent upon their citizenry. Given this relationship, it is un-
likely individual Congressmen will disregard their state's interests when forming leg-
islation or seek to destroy the state's ability to function with integrity in the federal
system. For the authoritative discussion of this thesis, see Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of
the National Government, 54 COLuM. L. REv. 543 (1954). Many later commentators
have criticized Wechsler's thesis on a number of grounds. See generally D. MA-
THEWS, U.S. SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD 92-242 (1960); Matsumoto, sura note I 1
at 59-60; Note, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: 4 Threat to Federalism, 76
COLUM. L. REv. 990, 1018 (1976); Note, Municpal Bankruptcy, The Tenth Amendment
and the New Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1871, 1885 (1976). National League of
Cities, then, can be read as a rejection of Wechslers thesis to the extent the Court
assumed the power to review the federalism implications of a congressional statute.
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, attacked the Rehnquist plurality for reversing the
Court's traditional position of deference to Congress on federalism questions. 426
U.S. at 876-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15. Federal courts have not adequately explained why the tenth amendment
should apply to only some of the enumerated powers. Some courts simply conclude
there is a difference in the scope of the enumerated powers justifying selective appli-
cation of the tenth amendment. E.g., Montgomery County v. Califano, 449 F. Supp.
1230, 1248 n.1 1 (D. Md. 1978), affd 599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979). The arguments for
not applying the constraints of the tenth amendment to statutes passed pursuant to the
fifth clause of the fourteenth amendment are stronger because that amendment specif-
ically prohibits states from taking certain actions. See City of Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156 (1980), rehearing denied 447 U.S. 916 (1980).
16. "Congress shall have Power.. .to pay the Debts and provide for the com-
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local governments to function effectively in the federal system. When
Congress creates a spending program for the benefit of the states, it
often attaches conditions which the states must comply with in order
to receive the offered federal funds. Often these conditions intrude
greatly on state sovereignty, requiring the states to restructure their
bureaucracies 7 or pass specific legislation 8 in order to receive the
federal benefit.
Federal courts consistently refuse to extend the constraints of the
tenth amendment to the conditional spending power' because of its
supposedly optional nature. Theoretically, conditional spending pro-
grams are not mandatory on the states. 20 The federal program is
made available to a state which then decides if it will participate. It is
mon Defense and general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 1.
Federal programs that offer a federal benefit to states provided the states comply with
specified conditions are called conditional spending programs. Use of the spending
power to create these programs is sometimes referred to as the conditional spending
power. See Note, The Federal Conditional Spending Power: A Search for Limits, 70
Nw. U.L. REv. 293, 294 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Federal Conditional Spending
Power].
17. E.g., Florida Dep't of Health and Rehab. Serv. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 274,
283-84 (N.D. Fla. 1978) aFd 585 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931
(1979) (Congress may require states to adopt a particular bureaucratic structure as
part of a federal spending program in order to ensure federal funds are administered
efficiently).
18. Many federal grant-in-aid programs require the state to supply matching
funds for whatever purposes the federal funds are received. Therefore, when a state
participates in a federal spending program, the state legislature must appropriate suf-
ficient state funds to match the federal benefit received. See Matsumoto, supra note
11, at 81-82.
19. Eg., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-43
(1947) (application of Hatch Act to the states as a condition for receiving federal
highway funds does not violate tenth amendment); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,
644-45 (1937) (special social security tax to support federal benefits for the aged does
not violate tenth amendment); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593-98
(1937) (combination of federal unemployment tax and tax credit did not coerce states
into participating in federal plan in violation of tenth amendment); Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923) (Federal Maternity Act, which provides federal
funds to the states to combat infant mortality, does not violate tenth amendment as
any state can refuse the funds at its option); Montgomery County v. Califano, 449 F.
Supp. 1230, 1247 (D. Md. 1978) (National Health Planning and Resources Develop-
ment Act, a spending program, does not violate tenth amendment); Vermont v. Brine-
gar, 379 F. Supp. 606, 617 (D. Vt. 1974) (withholding federal highway funds for
failure to comply with federal Highway Beautification Act does not violate tenth
amendment). See also notes 20-29 & 49-53 and accompanying text infra.
20. See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 1230, 1247 (D. Md.
1978). See generally The Federal Conditional Spending Power, supra note 16.
1981]
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only after a state decides to participate that it must comply with the
attached conditions. Courts reason that when a state decides to par-
ticipate in a conditional spending program, it cannot complain that
the conditions infringe on its sovereignty, as the decision to partici-
pate is in itself an exercise of sovereignty.
21
The Supreme Court defined the broad parameters of the condi-
tional spending power in Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service
Commission .22 At issue was the validity of Section 12 of the Hatch
Act,' which prohibited employees of state and local government
agencies, whose employment was connected with any activity
financed by the federal government, from taking part in partisan
political activities within their states. 4 A member of the Oklahoma
Highway Commission simultaneously served as chairman of the
Democratic State Central Committee. The Civil Service Commission
ordered that the individual be removed from the state highway com-
mission.25 Otherwise, the federal highway grants to Oklahoma
would be decreased.
Oklahoma argued that the Hatch Act intruded on its sovereignty in
violation of the tenth amendment.26 The Supreme Court rejected
this argument,27 ruling that while Congress had no independent
power to control the political activities of state employees, it could
control their activities as a condition to a federal grant under the
spending power.28 The Court also ruled that the Hatch Act was not
coercive because Oklahoma had available the "simple expedient" of
not complying with the order.29 The only consequence of non-com-
pliance would be its failure to receive a portion of the offered federal
funds.30
Many commentators argue that the tenth amendment limitations
established in National League of Cities should extend to the condi-
21. E.g., Montgomery County v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 1230, 1247 (D. Md. 1978).
22. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 1501 (1976).
24. Id. § 1502.
25. 330 U.S. at 133.
26. Id. at 142.
27. Id. at 143.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 143-44.
30. Id.
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tional spending power.3" They contend that states are dependent on
federal revenues which comprise a large and ever increasing portion
of their budgets.32 The States simply do not have the option of refus-
ing to participate in conditional spending programs. 3 It is inconsis-
tent with political and economic reality, therefore, to call conditional
spending programs "voluntary." The conditions attendant to the
programs are actually mandatory on the states. The commentators
thus conclude that the Tenth Amendment should be extended to con-
strain the intrusive nature of the programs.34
To date, federal courts have consistently rejected this argument.35
The traditional rationale of Oklahoma, that state participation in
conditional spending programs is voluntary, continues to prevail.
This broad interpretation of the conditional spending power allows
Congress an easy avenue around the restrictions established in Na-
tional League of Cities. Congress may simply put intrusive regula-
tions in the conditions it attaches to spending programs in which the
states are politically or economically bound to participate.36
31. See note I Isupra.
32. Federal aid as a percentage of funds generated by state and local governments
was 11.4% in 1954, 17.3% in 1964, and 29.5% in 1976. Between 1975 and 1976, the
increase was 20.3%. In the area of public assistance, federal funds comprise an even
larger portion of state and local government budgets. In 1950, federal funds consti-
tuted 44% of all public assistance funds generated by state and local governments. By
1974, that percentage increased to 54.2% See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IMPROVING URBAN AMERICA: A CHALLENGE TO FEDERAL-
ISM, 85, 87 (Sept. 1976); Note, Towards New Safeguards on Conditional Spending:
Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 726, 742 n.117
(1977) [hereinafter cited as New Safeguards].
33. Matsumoto, supra note 11, at 80-88; New Safeguards, supra note 32, at 726;
Note, Constitutional Law--The Federal System-State Sovereignty as an Implied Re-
straint upon the Commercial PoFwer-National League of Cities v. Usery, 52 WASH. L.
REV. 747, 764-65 (1977); Note, Emerging Concepts of Federalisnr Limitations on the
Spending Power and National Health Planning, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133, 1154-
58 (1977).
34. See note 11 supra.
35. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra. See also Florida Dep't of
Health v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 274, 284 (N.D. Fla. 1978) (state has option of refus-
ing to comply with requirements of Federal Rehabilitation Act and forfeiting the
funds offered as part of the program); Dupler v. City of Portland, 421 F. Supp. 1314,
1320-21 n.8 (D. Me. 1976) (requirements of Federal Food Stamp Act are not
mandatory on state and local governments but are enforceable only as a condition of
participation in the food stamp program; decision on whether to participate is volun-
tary with the states).
36. Note, Constitutional Law--The Federal System-State Sovereignty as an Im-
plied Restraint upon the Commerce Power-National League of Cities v. Usery, 52
1981]
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Federal courts refuse to find that dependence on federal funds co-
erces states into participating in federal spending programs. 37 Conse-
quently, they refuse to extend the affirmative constraints of the tenth
amendment to the conditional spending power.38 This position may
still have merit as applied to "traditional federal spending pro-
grams."39 It arguably has no merit in reference to conditional spend-
ing programs that include sanctions40 against non-participating
states.
Sanctions change the fundamental nature of a conditional spend-
ing program.4' The program becomes clearly coercive. States must
participate to avoid imposition of the sanction. The sanction usually
involves loss of a pre-existing federal benefit, the continuation of
which Congress suddenly makes contingent on participation in the
program. 42 The conditions attached to this type of spending program
often intrude on state sovereignty. Congress, however, must include
the sanction to ensure participation.
WASH. L. REV. 747, 764 (1977) (if state sovereignty limitations announced in National
League of Cities are not extended to the spending power, Congress could impose
FLSA provisions on the states simply by making them conditions of federal grants).
37. See, e.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589 (1937) (combina-
tion of unemployment tax and tax credit does not coerce states into creating con-
forming unemployment compensation programs); Montgomery County v. Califano,
449 F. Supp. 1230, 1247 (D. Md. 1978) (threatened loss of federal funds by state that
refuses to participate in National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of
1974 does not coerce state into participating in the program); Vermont v. Brinegar,
379 F. Supp. 606, 617 (D. Vt. 1974) (threat of 10% reduction in federal highway funds
for failure to participate in Highway Beautification Act of 1965 does not coerce state
participation). See also notes 18-19 supra.
38. See cases cited at note 19 supra.
39. For purposes of this discussion, "traditional federal spending program" means
those spending programs which impose no adverse consequences for state refusal to
participate, outside of the obvious consequence of not receiving the benefit attached
to the rejected program.
40. In this context, "sanctions" refers to adverse consequences for non-participa-
tion in a conditional spending program beyond the obvious consequence of not re-
ceiving the benefit attached to the rejected program.
41. Traditional federal spending programs can be considered voluntary no matter
how strongly a state is induced to participate because if it refuses to do so its status is
left unchanged. By contrast, when a state refuses to participate in a conditional
spending program with sanctions, its status is not left unchanged; it is placed in a
noticeably worse condition because of the sanction. Arguments about the voluntary
nature of the conditional spending power are inapplicable when the program created
pursuant to that power include sanctions against non-participating states.
42. See notes 63-67 and 102-07 and accompanying text infra.
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Admittedly, Congress is not required to create any conditional
spending programs at all. In addition, it is clear Congress may termi-
nate a spending program at any time simply by refusing to appropri-
ate the necessary funds. Nevertheless, the fact remains that when
Congress creates a spending program that includes sanctions for non-
participation, the practical effect is to deny the states any real choice
on whether to participate in the program.
By refusing to establish any federalism restrictions on the condi-
tional spending power, the Supreme Court has greatly weakened the
principles established in NationalLeague of Cities. It is anomalous to
allow Congress to reach through the spending power an end prohib-
ited pursuant to the commerce power. This is especially true when,
because of sanctions, the spending program becomes as mandatory as
a commerce regulation. If National League of Cities is to have any
more than procedural significance, the Supreme Court must give
Congress and lower courts guidance on the constitutional limitations
of the conditional spending power.
This note will argue that the tenth amendment limitations on the
commerce power established in National League of Cities should be
extended to bring into question the constitutionality of at least those
conditional spending programs which include severe sanctions
against non-participating states. Two programs will be examined:
the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, 4" and the
Flood Disaster Insurance Program.' Both provide excellent illustra-
tions of congressional intrusion into areas of traditional state sover-
eignty. By attaching conditions which effectively penalize non-
participation, Congress deprives the states of any meaningful choice.
In examining the constitutionality of these programs, a two step
analysis will be used: 1) Do the sanctions for non-participation
make the program in reality mandatory on the states? and 2) if so, do
the attached conditions violate the states' integral sovereignty within
the meaning of National League of Cities? If the answers to both of
these questions is yes, the tenth amendment should constrain the in-
trusive aspects of the program. The current narrow interpretation of
the tenth amendment allows Congress an easy method around the
principles established in National League of Cities and may alter the
43. Pub. L. No. 94-566, 90 Stat. 2670 (amending scattered sections of 26 and 42
U.S.C.) (1976).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4127 (1976).
1981]
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traditional structure of the federal system.4"
III. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AMENDMENTS OF 1976
A. Background
In 1935, Congress passed the Social Security Act. 6 The Act estab-
lished, among other things, an unemployment assistance program for
employees in the private sector. It levied a tax on employers of three
percent47 of their employees' annual salaries. It also allowed a com-
pensatory tax credit of up to ninety-percent48 of that amount for em-
ployers contributing to a federally approved state unemployment
compensation program.49 In addition, the Act provided federal
grants to the states to pay all of the costs of administering federally
approved unemployment compensation programs.5 0
The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of these provi-
sions in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis.5 The Steward Machine
Court expressly rejected the argument that the Social Security Act
45. It is clear that Congress does not have power to legislate for the general wel-
fare. See Federal Constitutional Spending Power, supra note 16 at 297, citing Burdick,
Federal Aid Legislation, in 3 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 628, 631
(1938). The list of enumerated powers granted to Congress, along with the safeguard
of the tenth amendment, establishes the principle of a limited federal Legislature as
one of the basic tenents of our federal system.
Congress does, however, have the power to spend for the general welfare. United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936). The spending power allows Congress to reach
areas outside the scope of the other enumerated powers. If Congress is allowed to
coerce state participation in federal spending programs, the conditions attached to
those programs become as mandatory as if they were in the form of regulatory legisla-
tion. This, in effect, allows Congress to "legislate" for the general welfare, and de-
stroys the concept of enumerated powers. See generally Federal Conditional Spending
Power, supra note 16.
46. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 42
U.S.C.).
47. Pub. L. No. 94-566, § 211(b) (1974) (amending 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301(A)(1) estab-
lished to current tax rate of 3.4%.
48. Because of the excise tax on employers was raised to 3.4%, the tax credit, 2.7%
of the federal tax, now covers approximately 79% of the federal tax. The federal tax
of .7% that is actually paid is used principally as grants to the states to finance admin-
istration of their federally approved unemployment program. See note 49 and ac-
companying text nfira.
49. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3302 (1976).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1976).
51. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
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violated the tenth amendment.5 2 The Court reasoned that the combi-
nation of the tax and tax credit only induced states to create federally
acceptable unemployment compensation plans.5 3 It concluded that
the creation of such inducements was within the proper scope of the
spending power.54
The Steward Machine Court concluded that states, in passing fed-
erally acceptable legislation, were at all times acting under their own
free will.55 The Act imposed no adverse consequences on states for
failing to enact conforming programs. It simply denied the tax credit
to private employers, as well as funds for administration of the pro-
gram.56
It is important to note that the Steward Machine Court specifically
stated that there were limits to the conditional spending power.57
The Court did not define those limits, however, as it found the statu-
tory scheme at issue to be within the power's proper scope.58
Unemployment legislation in the subsequent forty years did not
materially change the original scheme. In 1970, the Employment Se-
curity Amendments59 made additional federal funds available for the
states to supplement pre-existing benefits during periods of high un-
employment. As a prerequisite for receiving the additional funds,
and to maintain federal approval of state unemployment programs,
the 1970 Amendments required states to expand their unemployment
compensation coverage to employees of state hospitals and institu-
tions of higher education.' The amendments also required that each
state give its political subdivisions the option of extending their un-
employment compensation program coverage in a similar manner.6
In response to the worsening economic condition of the nation in
52. Id. at 585.
53. Id.
54. The Court stated that, "["o hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to
coercion is to plunge the law into endless difficulties." Id. at 589-90.
55. Id. at 586-90.
56. Id. at 592.
57. Id. at 591.
58. "We do not fix the outermost line. Enough for present purposes that wherever
the line may be, this statute is within it. Definition more precise must abide the wis-
dom of the future." Id.
59. Pub. L. No. 91-373, 84 Stat. 697 (1970) (amending scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. §§ 3301-3310 (1970)).
60. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A), (B) (1976).
61. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(16XA) (1976).
1981]
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1974, Congress enacted the Special Unemployment Assistance Pro-
gram6 (SUA), as part of the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment
Assistance Act of 1974.63 Title I of the Act provided additional fed-
eral funds to meet the needs of the increased numbers of unemployed
persons. ' Title II, the SUA, established that part of the additional
federal assistance would be used to pay unemployment benefits to all
state and local government employees not otherwise covered by state
unemployment assistance programs.65 The SUA was a temporary
measure,66 and the federal government supplied all of the funds for
the additional benefit.
B. The 1976 Amendments
The Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 197667 radi-
cally altered the nature of the original unemployment compensation
provisions upheld in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis.68 The amend-
ments required states to extend their unemployment compensation
benefits to almost all public employees previously covered by the
SUA program.6 9 If a state refused to so extend its unemployment
coverage, federal certification of its unemployment compensation
plan would cease.70 Private employers within the state would then
lose the federal tax credit on their federal unemployment payroll
taxes.7 Additionally, the state government would lose the federal
funds for administering its unemployment program. 72
In County of Los Angeles v. Marshall,73 a group of state and local
governments challenged the constitutionality of the 1976 Amend-
62. Pub. L. No. 93-567, 88 Stat. 1850 (Title II) (1974).
63. Pub. L. No. 93-567, 88 Stat. 1850 (1974).
64. Id. Title I.
65. Id. Title II.
66. The right to file an initial claim under this act ended December 31, 1977. Pub.
L. No. 93-567 § 208 (1974).
67. Pub. L. No. 94-566, 90 Stat. 2667 (1976) (amending 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3310
(1970)).
68. 301 U.S. 548 (1937). See notes 43-54 and accompanying text supra.
69. Pub. L. No. 94-566 § 115, 26 U.S.C. § 3306 (1976).
70. Pub. L. No. 94-566 § 101, 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1976).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 442 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1977), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 113, rehl. den. 101 S.
Ct. 573 (1980).
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ments. Plaintiffs alleged the cost of compliance with the amendments
would impair their tenth amendment right to function as sovereign
political entities within the federal system.74
The District Court for the District of Columbia rejected plaintiffs'
claim,75 holding that the 1976 Amendments did not fundamentally
change the nature of the original Act upheld in Steward Machine Co.
v. Davis.76 The court affirmed the broad interpretation of the condi-
tional spending power established in Oklahoma v. Civil Service Com-
mission,7 and found the 1976 Amendments to be within the proper
scope of that power.78 The court acknowledged the sanctions against
non-participating states, but ruled they were only inducements to
participation.79 They did not change the essentially voluntary nature
of the original program."0 The court recognized the extreme
financial consquences caused by compliance with the 1976 Amend-
ments, but concluded they did not affect the constitutionality of the
legislation.8
The District Court in County of Los Angeles held the amendments
did not violate the tenth amendment because the states had the op-
74. Plaintiffs alleged compliance with the 1976 Amendments would cost states be-
tween $385 million and $2 billion a year. Because 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3) requires a
due process hearing for any former employee who is denied compensation, compli-
ance with the 1976 Amendments produces a tremendous increase in administrative
and record keeping costs. Plaintiffs also alleged compliance with the amendments
would severely interfere with the hiring practices and policies of state and local gov-
ernments. To meet the costs of compliance, state and local governments would have
to drastically reduce the number of state employees, programs, and would severely
interfere with the hiring practices and policies of state and local governments. To
meet the costs of compliance, state and local governments would have to drastically
reduce the number of state employees, programs, and services. Particularly affected
would be part-time and seasonal employees, who are often involved in programs that
directly benefit large sections of the underprivileged population. See Brief of Joint
Appellants at 24-50, County of Los Angeles v. Marshall, 442 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C.
1977); Brief amicus curiae of International Personnel Management Ass'n and Na-
tional School Boards Ass'n, County of Los Angeles v. Marshall, 442 F. Supp. 1186
(D.D.C. 1977).
75. 442 F. Supp. at 1192.
76. 301 U.S. 548 (1937). See notes 43-54 and accompanying text supra.
77. 330 U.S. 127 (1947). See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra.
78. 442 F. Supp. at 1190.
79. Id. at 1191.
80. Id. at 1190-91.
81. Id. at 1192 n.5.
1981]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
tion of not participating in the program. 2 The court failed to ac-
knowledge, however, that the consequences of non-participation
would also infringe on state sovereignty. If a state chooses not to
comply with the 1976 Amendments, its private employers lose the
federal unemployment tax credit they have enjoyed since 1935.83
The non-complying state must then choose between dismantling its
unemployment compensation program or subjecting its private sector
employers to double taxation. The former alternative clearly in-
fringes on state autonomy by interfering with a state's power to pro-
vide for the welfare of its citizens. The state would not have to
dismantle its own program but for the presence of the 1976 Amend-
ments.
If a non-complying state maintains its own unemployment pro-
gram, it subjects its private employers to the heavy burden of having
to pay full federal and state unemployment compensation taxes. This
would inevitably result in an exodus of private investment from the
non-complying state. This exodus would decrease the state's tax
base, thereby reducing its ability to provide essential services.8 4 In
view of these consequences, the 1976 Amendments clearly impair the
ability of states to function effectively in the federal system whether
or not the state complies with the amendments. The severe sanctions
for non-compliance show that Congress intended the amendments to
be mandatory."5 Congress should not be allowed to hold a state's
82. Id. at 1191. See notes 75-81 and accompanying text supra.
83. Joint Brief of Appellants at 20-21, County of Los Angeles v. Marshall, 442 F.
Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1977).
Federal sanctions operate on all private employers within a non-conforming
State. The Sanction is triggered not by the nonconformance of the Federal tax-
payer private employer, but by the nonconformance of the taxpayer's State se-
lected officials. Federal sanctions operate against private employer Federal
taxpayers even if the only non-conformity of the unemployment law of a particu-
lar state involves only the failure to tax (or provide benefits for former employees
of) State and local governments.
Id. See notes 67-72 and accompanying text supra.
84. If a state were to refuse to comply with the 1976 Amendments, the resulting
sanctions would result in the immediate migration of private employers to complying
states and the subsequent erosion of the tax base on the non-complying state. States
are in competition to attract private investment. A non-complying state would be in
an extreme disadvantage in this area. Brief amicus curiae of International Personnel
Management Ass'n and National School Bd. Ass'n at 15-24, County of Los Angeles v.
Marshall, 442 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1977).
85. See Legislative History, S. REP. No. 94-1265, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), re-
printed in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5997, 6003. See also H.R. CONF.
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private employers hostage in order to force the state to extend unem-
ployment compensation coverage to its own employees.
The 1976 Amendments are wholly unrelated to the pre-existing un-
employment compensation program. Congress should be prohibited
from making continuation of the pre-existing tax credit contingent
upon compliance with the amendments. The Social Security Act of
1935 encouraged states to create federally acceptable unemployment
programs for their private sector employees.16 The temporary SUA
program extended federal unemployment benefits to state and local
government employees not otherwise covered by state or local unem-
ployment programs.8 7 The 1976 Amendments transfer this burden to
the states by requiring them to extend unemployment compensation
coverage to their own employees at their own expense.8 Certainly
the Court's rationale in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis for upholding
the original act 9 should not control the validity of these totally unre-
lated amendments.
Congress put the 1976 Amendments in the form of a conditional
spending program because it realized if it tried to achieve the same
end through the commerce power the statute would be subject to con-
stitutional challenge?0 The power to structure employee-employer
relationships is clearly within the traditional scope of state sover-
eignty." In National League of Cities, the Supreme Court invali-
dated the 1974 FLSA Amendments because they directly displaced
state autonomy in this area.92 The amendments upheld in County of
Los Angeles v. Marshall intrude no less directly on this attribute of
state sovereignty.93 The tremendous costs to the states of complying
REP. No. 1745, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 11 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6033-35. (States would be required to extend coverage in the
federally prescribed manner to maintain federal approval of their unemployment
compensation plan).
86. See notes 46-50 and accompanying text supra.
87. See notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra.
88. See notes 67-72 and accompanying text supra.
89. See notes 51-58 and accompanying text upra.
90. See S. REP. No. 94-1265, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976), reprintedin [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5997, 6004-05 (Congress considered whether National
League of Cities affected constitutionality of the 1976 Amendments and concluded it
did not because of the form of the legislation).
91. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).
92. Id. at 852. See notes 1-10 and accompanying text supra.
93. See notes 82-85 and accompanying text supra.
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with these amendments will drastically affect their ability to structure
their employment policies as they see fit.94 The 1976 Amendments
should be invalidated under the rationale of National League of Cit-
ies.9
5
IV. THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
The evolution of the National Flood Insurance Program96 is an-
other example of congressional coercion to compel state participation
in conditional spending programs by attaching penalties for non-
participation. In 1968, Congress passed the National Flood Insur-
ance Act (1968 Act).97 This Act gave state and local governments
within federally designated flood zones the opportunity to allow their
residents to purchase federally subsidized flood insurance.98 It re-
quired communities, as a condition of participation, however, to
adopt federal land use and construction regulations.99
The 1968 Act was a 'traditional' spending program in that the only
consequence of non-participation was the denial of the opportunity
to purchase the offered flood insurance. The vast majority of state
and local governments within federally designated flood zones re-
fused to participate because they objected to giving up local regula-
94. See note 74 supra.
95. In New Hampshire v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 246-49 (1st Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 53 (1980), the First Circuit expressly rejected the argument that the
tenth amendment should be applied to the 1976 Amendments. The court adhered to
the traditional view that all conditional spending programs are optional. Id. at 245.
Therefore, the tenth amendment constraints established in National League do not
apply to the 1976 Amendments. Id. at 245-46. In rejecting the argument that the
sanctions for non-compliance with the 1976 Amendments coerces states into partici-
pating in the program in contravention of the tenth amendment, the court stated:
"We do not agree that the carrot has become a club because the rewards for con-
forming have increased. It is not the size of the stakes that controls, but the rules of
the game. The basic design and mechanisms of the Act have not changed since 1935."
Id. at 246. This result, as well as that in County ofLos Angeles v. Marshall, firmly
entrenches the traditionally broad interpretation of the spending power.
96. The National Flood Insurance Program is composed of the National Flood
Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, Title VIII, 1968; Title IV of H.U.D. Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-152 (1969); The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-234 (1973); Section 816 of the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383 (1974); Pub. L. No. 94-375, Title VII of Pub. L. No. 95-128;
codpfedat 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1976).
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1976).
98. National Flood Insurance Act, §§ 1305-1307, 42 U.S.C. § 4011 (1976).
99. Id. § 1315, 42 U.S.C. § 4022 (1976).
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tory control over land use and construction. 1"° Landowners and
local governments within flood zones realized that the decision to
participate would be their last locally controlled decision with respect
to their land. In addition, the federally mandated regulations would
substantially increase construction costs within a participating com-
munity. The increased costs would impede development and lower
property values.' °0
In 1973, Congress passed the Flood Disaster Protection Act (1973
Act).' 02 The express purpose of the 1973 Act was to eliminate the
voluntary nature of the 1968 Act and force participation by federally
designated flood areas in the federal insurance program. 3 The 1973
Act accomplishes this by imposing severe sanctions against both non-
participating communities and private property owners not covered
by the offered flood insurance. Section 102 of the 1973 Act"° penal-
izes property owners in federally designated flood zones who do not
purchase the offered flood insurance by 1) cutting off all federal
financial assistance for acquisition or construction purposes regard-
ing flood prone property, and 2) prohibiting federally regulated pri-
vate lending institutions from making loans secured by the flood
prone property. 0 5 Section 202 of the 1973 Act"°6 denies non-partici-
pating communities federal financial assistance for acquisition and
construction purposes, as well as disaster relief in the event of a
flood.10
7
100. In January 1973, only 2,000 communities participated under the 1968 Act,
and only 200,000 private landowners were insured. Oversight of the National Flood
Insrance Progranm Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Comm Develop-
ment of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist
Sess. 404 (1977) (Ruth Prohop, General Counsel, Dept. of HUD).
101. See notes 123-27 and accompanying text infra.
102. Pub. L. No. 93-234 (1973), cod,edin 42 U.S.C. §§4001-4128 (1976).
103. See S. REP. No. 93-583, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS p. 3217 (Senate Report). See also HUD Space-Science-Veteran's
Appropriationsfor 1974 Hearings Before a Subcomm. of House Comm on Appropria-
tions, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 785 (1973) (statement of George Bernstein, Admin. of FIA)
(the flood insurance program will never work as long as entry into it is voluntary).
104. Pub. L. No. 93-234 at § 102 (1973), 42 U.S.C. § 4012(a) (1976).
105. Id.
106. Id. at § 202 (1973), 42 U.S.C. § 4106 (1976).
107. Id. Congress amended this section in § 703 of the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 106(b) as amended
(1977). As amended, § 202 is merely a notice provision to require lenders to inform
potential borrowers if their property will not be eligible for federal disaster relief in
the event of a flood. The 1977 amendment, however, left standing the direct federal
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In essence, the 1973 Act requires commodities in federally
designated flood zones to participate in the flood insurance program
in order to receive any futher federal assistance. Moreover, private
property owners within these areas must purchase the offered flood
insurance, not only to be eligible for direct federal assistance, but also
to be eligible for loans from any federally supervised private lending
institution. Without loans and mortgages from these institutions,
construction is impossible. Non-participation then, essentially de-
stroys property values within the community.108
In Texas Landowners Rights Association v. Harris,1 °9 a group of
municipalities and private landowners within federally designated
flood areas brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief
challenging the constitutionality of the National Flood Insurance
Program as amended by the 1973 Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the
sanctions against non-participating communities coerced entry into
the program, and that the applicable federal regulations violated the
tenth amendment.110 Since, therefore, the regulations were in effect
mandatory on the states, they contended that the theory of National
League of Cities should be extended to limit the intrusive aspects of
the program. ' 11
The district court, following the rationale established in County of
Los Angeles v. Marshall,1 ' held that the 1973 Act, as a conditional
spending program, was not subject to the limitations established in
National League of Cities." 3 Accordingly, it granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment."I4
assistance sanction, which blocks direct federal grant aid and FHA and VA mortgages
for flood zoned property in non-participating communities. So even after this amend-
ment, the sanctions against non-participating communities are still very severe.
In the words of Congressman Taylor, sponsor of the 1977 Amendment: "My
amendment leaves untouched section 202(a), the Federal assistance sanctions, which
is more than enough incentive to get communities to participate. This sanction ap-
plies to direct Federal grant aid as well as to FHA and VA mortgages, and to subsi-
dized housing." 123 Cong. Rec. 14382 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Taylor).
108. See New Safeguards, supra note 32, at 749.
109. 453 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978), a 'd, 598 F.2d 311 (1979), cer. denied, 444
U.S. 927 (1980).
110. Id. at 1028.
111. Id. at 1028-29.
112. 442 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1977). See notes 73-81 and accompanying text
supra.
113. 453 F. Supp. at 1033.
114. Id.
[Vol. 21:217
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol21/iss1/6
CONDITIONAL SPENDING POWER
The court considered the 1973 Act to be within the traditionally
broad scope of the conditional spending power. 15 It acknowledged
that the severe sanctions for noncompliance strongly induced state
participation. 1 6 Nonetheless, it rejected the argument that the sanc-
tions coerced participation and made the program mandatory within
the meaning of National League of Cities." 7 Accordingly, the court
held that the National Flood Insurance Program did not violate the
tenth amendment." 8
The Texas Landowners court refused to acknowledge the coercive
nature of the 1973 Act because it did want to assume the task of de-
termining the boundary line between inducement and coercion. 19
The express intent of the 1973 Act was to make the insurance pro-
gram mandatory on affected communities and property owners.120 It
accomplished this by making the sanctions for non-participation so
great that affected communities had no choice but to participate.1 21
In upholding the constitutionality of the 1973 Act as a valid exer-
cise of the conditional spending power, the Texas Landowners court
put form over reality. Clearly, the choice to participate in the insur-
ance program, in light of the penalties for non-participation, is really
no choice at all.' The 1973 Act effectively made the National Flood
Insurance Program mandatory. The court should have conducted a
National League of Cities type of inquiry to see if the conditions in-
volved violated the principles of the tenth amendment.
It is well settled that jurisdiction over land use and construction
regulations is within the traditional scope of state sovereignty-1 23
Under the program at issue, every participating community must
adopt detailed zoning and building regulations established for it by
the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD).124 It is hard to imagine how Congress could more effectively
115. Id. at 1030.
116. Id at 1030-31.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See notes 102-08 and accompanying text supra.
121. Id.
122. See New Safeguards, upra note 32, at 751.
123. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 373 (1926). See
also New Safeguards, supra note 32, at 752 n.163.
124. See notes 96-101 and accompanying text supra.
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displace state autonomy in this area. The rationale of National
League of Cities should extend to this program to prevent Congress
from usurping this attribute of state sovereignty.
Participation in the flood insurance program is also very costly for
the affected communities and property owners. 125 Plaintiffs argued
the HUD regulations significantly increased the cost of development
in the designated communities.2 6 These increased costs lower prop-
erty values, which decreases the tax base, impairing the ability of the
affected community to function effectively. 27 In addition, the in-
creased costs of property development may result in marginal prop-
erty not being developed at all. This may impair a community's
efforts to provide adequate low income housing in urban areas. 128
Clearly, Congress has a legitimate interest in limiting the amount
of federal money spent for flood disaster relief. In accomplishing this
goal, however, Congress should not be allowed to impair the ability
of state and local governments to function as sovereign political enti-
ties in the federal system.' 29 In addition, Congress should not be al-
lowed to hold private landowners hostage in order to force
communities within designated flood areas to participate in the pro-
gram. The Texas Landowners court should have extended the tenth
amendment principles enunciated in National League of Cities to
limit the intrusive nature of the 1973 Act.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should reconsider the current broad interpre-
tation of the conditional spending power in light of present economic
realities and the principles established in National League of Cities.
Clearly, when Congress creates a conditional spending program that
includes severe sanctions for non-participation, it intends to make the
program mandatory on the states. Theories on the voluntary nature
of the spending power are inapplicable to these programs. A result
that is prohibited by the tenth amendment pursuant to one enumer-
ated power should not be found constitutional through exercise of
125. See notes 126-27 and accompanying text infra. See also New Safeguards,
supra note 32, at 753-57.
126. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 9,
Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978).
127. Id. at 8, 12.
128. See New Safeguards, supra note 32, at 756-57.
129. See note 45 supra.
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another. 30
The ramifications of the current limited construction of the tenth
amendment are enormous. Through the conditional spending power,
Congress possesses the potential to usurp the most vital attributes of
state sovereignty. State and local governments may someday become
little more than sub-agencies of the federal government, forced to
carry out intrusive federal regulations as part of coercive spending
programs.
The Supreme Court evidently still relies on the political process to
limit federal intrusions on state sovereignty.131 It is clear, however,
political restraints are not always sufficient. The Court must take a
more active role in limiting federal intrusions on states pursuant to
the conditional spending power.
One reason for the current broad interpretation of the conditional
spending power may be the difficulty that exists in establishing con-
stitutional guidelines for conditional spending programs. While the
sanction-incentive distinction presented here may be of limited util-
ity, it constitutes a basis from which the Court could develop a func-
tional set of federalism constraints for these programs.' 32 The
Supreme Court's failure to even acknowledge that the tenth amend-
ment is applicable to the conditional spending power perverts the
fundamental nature of that power and perpetuates a very dangerous
fiction that may undermine the federal system.
130. See note 15 supra.
131. See note 14supra.
132. Clearly, a state may be coerced into participating in a conditional spending
program as strongly by its need for offered federal funds as by its need for the contin-
uation of an existing federal benefit. Because of this, the Court may deem it necessary
to extend the restrictions of the tenth amendment to al spending programs, not only
those that threaten the discontinuation of an existing federal benefit upon non-com-
pliance.
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